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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1957
that the covenant did not ran with the land," hence, the present owners
were not liable.
In last year's survey the importance of property relationships to the
right of an injured person to recover in tort was noted.12 A recent court
of appeals decision denied a wrongful death claim because the relation-
ship of decedent to the defendant was that of landlord and tenant rather
than lodginghouse keeper and lodger.' 3 The decedent died from monox-
ide poisoning due to an unvented gas heater. The decedent had paid his
rent for one week, made a key deposit, and entered into possession. The
landlord retained the right to make weekly inspections. Because the
defect was patent, the landlord was not liable.'4
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Zoning Ordinance Forbidding Removal of Valuable
Minerals - Constitutionality
Although the case did not involve zoning by a municipal corpora-
tion, East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth,' may well have an important bear-
ing upon the constitutionality of such ordinances when enacted by munic-
ipal legislative bodies. The legislation in question was a zoning resolu-
tion2 of a township, as distinguished from that of a municipal corpora-
tion.8 It prohibited the removal of coal by the strip mining method.
Rather than turning upon the permission of the statutes to "regulate"
rather than to "prohibit," the case appears to turn on the fact that the
land in question was underlain with minerals (coal) having a present
fair market value in excess of $1,000,000, while the land itself after
such removal, or if removal were forbidden had a value of approximately
$17,000.
The court seemed impressed by the following factors: the coal could
be removed only through strip mining or the open pit method; that such
'As to the distinction between real and personal covenants see: 15 Omo JUR. 2d,
Covenants §§ 14-22 (1955).
"Di Renzo v. Cavalier, 165 Ohio St. 386, 135 N.E.2d 394 (1956).
"Branham, Admrx. v. Fordyce, 103 App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957). The ten-
ant is put into the exclusive possession of his rooms, while the boarder or lodger has
merely the use of them without the actual or exclusive possession, which is in the
lessor subject to such use. 24 OHIo Jui. Landlord and tenant § 7 (1932). It
would appear, therefore, that the duty owed a boarder or lodger is that owed to a
business invitee, i.e. ordinary care, whereas the tenant is bound by caveat emptor ex-
cept as to latent defects.
" 24 Omo JuR. Landlord and tenant § 185 (1932).
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operation would constitute only a temporary use of the land, following
which in approximately six years the land would be restored to agricul-
tural uses; that the land in question was rural and open, with only a few
houses and other structures located in the general vicinity thereof; that
the plaintiff had been granted a license to strip mine the land by the
Division of Reclamation of the Department of Agriculture of the State
of Ohio4 under which plaintiff would be required to "reclaim" the lands;
and that the legislation, to the extent that it applied to the property of
the plaintiffs, was unreasonable and arbitrary in that it deprived plain-
tiffs of their property without due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States and of
Sections 1, 16, and 19, Article I of the State Constitution.
To the extent that the opinion might later be used as an analogy in
striking down the power of a municipal corporation to prohibit similar
invasions of what are essentially residential areas by unsightly, noisome,
and hazardous uses, the decision appears to this writer a highly danger-
ous invasion of constitutional home rule and an utter disregard of many
items dear to the individual in favor of purely economic factors. All
zoning (unless completely unrestricted) hurts someone, and if the people
of suburban residential areas have no more protection than such a deci-
sion gives to them from the ravages of industrial horrors, then we might
as well give the country back to the Indians.5
Right of Signer to Withdraw Signature From
Referendum Petition
The right of a person who signs a petition directed to a body having
power to perform or refrain from performing the act which is the sub-
ject matter of the petition is well established. The general rule is that
in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary an elector signing
a petition authorized by law has a right to withdraw his signature there-
from at any time before official action has been taken on it.6
The problem arises when the time for action is uncertain. In Lynn
2 166 Ohio St. 379, 143 N.E.2d 309 (1957).
2 So called in the court's opinion. The statutes permitting township zoning use the
word "resolution." OHIO REv. CODE c. 519.
3OHIo REv. CODE § 713.07-.13.
4OMo REv. CODE § 1513.01.
In the 1956 Annual Survey, there was reported the case of Cleveland Builders Sup-
ply Company v. City of Garfield Heights, 102 Ohio App. 69, 136 N.E.2d 105,
(1956), in which similar reasoning was applied to the zoning ordinance of a mu-
nicipal corporation. Apparently, then, no distinction will be made between the zon-
ing powers of a township and of a municipal corporation.
6State ex rel. Kahle v. Rupert, 99 Ohio St. 17, 122 N.E. 39 (1918).
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v. Supple,7 there were involved the passage of an ordinance amending
the zoning ordinance of the City of Mayfield Heights, a petition of 1,008
electors calling for a referendum thereon, a counterpetition containing the
names of 517 electors asking that their names be withdrawn from the
referendum petition, and a counter-counter-petition signed by 25 of the
electors who had signed each of the previous two petitions.8
The question therefore became one of how many valid signatures
remained. The municipal charter provision provided for the presenta-
tion of a properly executed referendum petition to the clerk of council
within 40 days after final passage by council of the disputed legislation,
the examination thereof by the clerk and its presentation to council with-
in 30 days after its filing with the clerk, the reconsideration of the ordi-
nance by council and, in the event of council's failure to repeal it, its
submission to the electorate. The charter provisions were silent as to
the length of time given for reconsideration of the measure by council.9
The clerk had not taken any action at all on the referendum petitions
until after the filing of the last one.
The Supreme Court held, adhering to the rule enunciated in the
Rupert case,10 that the right to withdraw one's name existed up to the
time the petition has been acted upon and that no particular formality is
required to effectuate the withdrawal, provided that it is sufficiently es-
tablished that the identity of the signer is that of the party indicating his
withdrawal, (presumably the withdrawal must be in writing) 11 and that
"final action" had not yet taken place, since the petition had not yet been
presented to council.' 2
1166 Ohio St. 154, 140 N.E.2d 555 (1957).
'This may appear confusing, but it is typical of uninformed and ill-considered public
reaction to proceedings of municipal legislative bodies. The author of this portion
of this survey has a total of 20 years' experience representing three municipal coun-
cils, and while he has never had this exact experience, he was not at all astonished
to read of it.
'The reader's attention is also directed to State, ex rel. Endress v. Wellington, 166
at all for reconsideration by the council of legislation at which the referendum is
directed. Oflo REv. CODE § 731.29. The idea of giving the legislative body a
chance to reconsider is a laudable one, but unless a limitation is put upon it in char-
ter referendum provisions the result will frequently be just what happened in the
case under discussion.
I" Sepra note 6.
'The opinion cites authorities from other jurisdictions cootra.
"The reader's attention is also directed to State, ex. rel. Endress v. Wellington, 166
Ohio St. 166, 140 N.E.2d 563 (1957) decided the same day, in which it was held
that when a petition containing the requisite number of signatures was filed within
the time provided by the state statute, but of which a number sufficient to bring the
total below the requirement were withdrawn, so that the petition became inadequate,
a supplemental petition containing new names could not be filed after the statutory
date for filing petitions. The result appears logical, but the opportunities for fraud
19581
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Right of Councilman to Hold Other Public Office
Until September 30, 1955, the Revised Code forbade municipal coun-
cilmen to hold any other public office or employment.'3 The prohibition
was applied with a broad brush so as to extend to all public positions and
employment, such as a member of the state board of health, military ser-
vice of the United States, state university professor, and public school
teacher. 14
As of September 30, 1955, the Legislature amended the section' 5 to
forbid only the holding of other public office, or "employment with said
village." The first reported decision under the new statute appears to be
State ex rel. Scarl -v. Sma116 in which the Court of Appeals for Portage
County held a village councilman who was a public school teacher in a
nearby city to be eligible to act as councilman.
The court was faced only with deciding whether the position of school
teacher was a "public office" as a result of the amendment of the statute.
The court applied the definition given to State ex rel. Attorney General
V. Jennings,17 that:
To constitute a public office ... it is essential that certain indepen-
dent public duties, a part of the sovereignty of the state, should be ap-
pointed to it by Law, to be exercised by the incumbent in virtue of his
election or appointment to the office thus created and defined, and not as a
mere employee, subject to the direction and control of someone else.
The court held that the school teacher was not holding public office, but
was engaged under contract to perform public employment, and therefore
eligible to hold office as councilman.
Exclusion of Through Trucks From Municipal Highways
In the 1956 Annual Survey,' we commented upon the case of Richter
Concrete Corp. v. City of Reading'9 in which the Court of Appeals of
Hamilton County had declared unconstitutional an ordinance which
prohibited the operation of trucks weighing over 20,000 pounds gross
are obvious. See also State ex rel. Wilson v. Bd. of Education, 102 Ohio App.
541, 144 N.E.2d 323 (1956), Aff'd 166 Ohio St. 260, 141 N.E.2d 289 (1957),
another interesting case on the right of signatories to withdraw from a petition.
1 OHIO REV. CODE, § 731.12.
U See cases noted in footnotes to the above section and its equivalent, Ellis' O-o
MUNICIPAL CODE 5 731. 02 (10th ed. 1955).
1 126 OHio LAws 287.
1 145 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'T57 Ohio St. 415, 49 N.E. 404 (1898).
1"7 WEST. RES.L. LREv. 301 (1957).
" 103 Ohio App. 67, 136 N.E.2d 422 (1956).
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weight on streets of the city of Reading (except state highways) but
which excepted from the prohibition operations of loading or unloading
in the city or traveling to or from the city. The court reasoned that the
effect was to discriminate against non-residents, particularly those driv-
ing through the city.
The Supreme Court sustained the court of appeals in 1957, approving
both the reasoning in and result of its opinion.20
Injunction Against Zoning Violation
Most zoning ordinances have traditionally contained provisions mak-
ing their violation a misdemeanor and establishing fines and penalties for
violation thereof. A few years ago the General Assembly amended2-
what was then Section 4366-12 of the General Code22 to permit the
municipal corporation or the owner of any contiguous or neighboring
property who would be especially damaged by such violation to institute
a suit for injunction to prevent or terminate such violation, in addition
to any other remedies provided by law.
The interpretation and, inferentially, the validity of the provision
with respect to injunctive remedies came before the Supreme Court in
Johnson v. United Enterprises, Inc. 3 The contention was that since the
persons seeking the injunction had a right of appeal24 to the common
pleas court from the order of the municipal board of zoning appeals
which had granted the allegedly illegal permit, they could not have re-
course to injunctive proceedings.
The Court properly distinguished Eggers v. Morr,25 which involved no
problem of erecting, constructing, altering, repairing or maintaining of
any building or structure or the use of any land in violation of any zon-
ing ordinance or regulation, but rather a resolution of the county commis-
sioners which had actually amended a county zoning resolution.
Section 713.13 is a special statute, and comes within the "... unless
otherwise provided by law .. ." clause of Section 2505.03.
"0 166 Ohio St. 279, 142 N.E.2d 525 (1957).
S124 OHio L Ws 555, 556 (effective 10-1-53).
2Now OHIO RzV. CODE 5 713.13.
" 166 Ohio St. 149, 140 N.E.2d 407 (1957).
"OHIO Rnv. CODEr S 2505.03:
Every final order, judgment or decree of a court and, when provided
by law, the final order of any administrative officer, tribunal or commis-
sion may be reviewed as provided in Sections 2505.03 to 2505.45, inclu-
sive, of the Revised Code, unless otherwise provided by law....
162 Ohio S. 521, 124 N.E.2d 115 (1955).
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Observance By Council of Its Own Rules Not Required
Nearly all legislative bodies adopt and from time to time amend their
own rules of procedure. Municipal councils are specifically authorized
by statute to do so2 6 although, it is submitted, the power is inherent and
needs no statutory grant of authority. In practice, this is done in two
ways, either by motion of council or by an ordinance enacted as are other
items of permanent legislation.
The power of a municipal council to pass legislation in a manner con-
trary to the method therefor, which had previously been established by an
existing ordinance of its predecessor, was in issue in Humphrey v. City
of Youngstown.27 The city council passed an ordinance amending its
zoning ordinance. While the zoning amendment conformed, in the steps
taken in the passage thereof, with the applicable state statutes,28 the coun-
cil appears definitely to have violated the rules of parliamentary proce-
dure theretofore adopted by councilmanic ordinance. No effort was
made to amend the parliamentary rules ordinance.
The right of a legislative body to depart freely from its own rules
was upheld by the court of appeals. Ample authority therefor, exists in
the decisions of courts in other states and in an earlier opinion of the
Ohio Supreme Court dealing with the right of the General Assembly to
do likewise.29 Such departures will not be the subject of judicial inquiry,
so long as they do not violate vested rights or fundamental law such as a
charter provision.3 0
Fire and Police Relief and Pension Funds
In order -to insure that members of municipal police and fire depart-
ments may be cared for in case of disability in line of duty and in their
old age, and that their dependents may not become public charges, the
Legislature has enacted comprehensive relief and pension legislation for
both departments in all municipal corporations having "full time" depart-
ments.3 1 The establishment of such funds is mandatory; the funds are
2°O-IO REV. CODE § 731.45.
- 143 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
-'OHIO REV. CODE §§ 713.07-.13.
State ex rel. City Loan and Savings Co. of Wapakoneta v. Moore, 124 Ohio St.
256, 177 N.E. 910 (1931).
' As to the rule in changing a basic document such as a state constitution or a mu-
nicipal charter, however, see Leach v. Brown, 167 Ohio St. 1, 145 N.E.2d 525
(1957).
" OHIO REV. CODE, c. 741.
Uune
